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ABSTRACT
This article seeks light on the main claim of the Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) framework that public policies can help to shape comparative
advantage, and, to complement existing assessments that have relied
predominantly on qualitative data from a few economic sectors. It
examines the distribution of export success in a number of economic
sectors, in which competitiveness is characterized by either radical or
incremental innovation. Unlike previous studies, it does this across
all those OECD countries clearly identified in the VoC literature as
either liberal market economies, co-ordinated market economies or
unclassified. Moreover, it draws on the latest available data at the lowest
level of aggregation. In contrast to previous studies, a more appropriate
measure of trade specialization, revealed symmetric comparative
advantage, is used. Overall, the evidence supports the VoC framework;
however, in some sectors, the data raise important conceptual and
methodological issues overlooked in current research.
In recent years there has been heightened interest into the effects of
increased global competition (product-market de-regulation, technologi-
cal advances, enhanced capital mobility, and the spread of the market
system) on national public policies (Berger and Dore, ; Hall and
Soskice, a; Hollingsworth and Boyer, ; Lu¨tz, ; Whitley,
). The mainstream view is that public-policy frameworks that
hinder the freedom of companies to adjust their strategies – for example,
in terms of output or employment – will have to de-regulate their
economies (Esping-Andersen and Regini, ; Scharpf and Schmidt,
), so that firms operating there can compete more effectively. The
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view that de-regulated economies perform better than those that hamper
managers’ prerogatives is especially prevalent in the public debate
(Economist, ). Such a view obviously assumes that there is one best
way for countries – via the companies that operate in them – to achieve
economic success. An important exception to this view is the recent
volume on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) edited by Hall and Soskice
(a; see also Hall ). It argued, in part at least, that ‘ non-market’
public policies, such as regulated labour markets, might offer distinct
benefits to companies.
The main and innovative claim of the VoC framework is that different
types of national institutional settings, which are categorized as either
liberal market economies (LMEs) or co-ordinated market economies
(CMEs) or unclassified by Hall and Soskice (b: –), will favour
contrasting innovation strategies either radical or incremental. These
different innovation strategies are, in turn, likely to lead to success in
different product markets. Indeed, as the subtitle of the volume makes
clear, Hall and Soskice contend that national economic institutions –
which include public and para-public policies – lay the foundations for
comparative advantage. They argue, therefore, that these institutional
differences will result in ‘ cross-national patterns of [product] specializ-
ation’ Hall and Soskice (b: ). (See also Casper and Whitley, ;
Hall, ; Soskice, ; cf. Bartle, .) From that main claim, two
broad expectations can be drawn. Firstly, LMEs, compared to CMEs,
will tend to have a higher number of sub-sectors in which they have a
comparative advantage in sectors characterized by radical innova-
tion, and, secondly, that CMEs should outperform LMEs in sectors
characterized by incremental innovation.
Despite many empirical analyses within the Varieties of Capitalism
volume and despite other studies that have attempted to assess the
paradigm (Casper and Matraves, ; Casper and Whitley, ; Hall
and Gingerich, ; Paunescu and Schneider, ; Soskice, ), the
measure of trade specialization used in this paper, revealed symmetric
comparative advantage (RSCA), has tended to be overlooked, even though
it is a more appropriate measure of comparative advantage than those
used by other researchers. Where it has been used before (Fioretos, ),
the data underpinning it come from . Building on the work by Fioretos
(), this paper will classify economic sub-sectors according to whether
they are characterized by incremental or radical innovation. It will then
examine the distribution of sub-sectors within broader economic sectors in
which all OECD countries identified as either LMEs, CME or unclassified
(Hall and Soskice, b: –) have a comparative advantage.
This paper, therefore, will update some analyses within the VoC
framework by drawing upon more recent data. Unlike previous studies it
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will provide comprehensive coverage of both the economic sectors and
the countries to which the VoC paradigm applies. Moreover, the analysis
will rely on data at the lowest possible level of data aggregation of the
standard international trade classification (SITC) system (revision ). By
adopting a quantitative approach, this paper aims to complement
assessments of the VoC paradigm carried out at the sectoral level that
rely predominantly on qualitative data (Casper and Matraves, ;
Casper and Whitley, ). This paper will also outline how many of the
arguments in the VoC literature are based on the concept of necessity and
not suﬃciency. This has important ramifications for the type of analytical
techniques used and the interpretation of the evidence.
The next section outlines the VoC approach and discusses the concept
of necessity, and the way it applies to the VoC framework. Previous
studies in this area are then outlined. A section on data and methodology
used in this paper will, inter alia, outline why revealed symmetric
comparative advantage (RSCA) is a more appropriate measure than that
used by Soskice () in a similar analysis. It will be followed by an
examination of the distribution of sub-sectors in which CMEs, LMEs and
‘ unclassifieds’ have a comparative advantage. The sub-sectors form part
of seven, broader economic sectors that are characterized by either
incremental or radical innovation. Finally, the broader ramifications of
the findings of this paper for the VoC approach are discussed.
The importance of public policies in the varieties of capitalism framework
The VoC framework focuses on many important areas of public policy
and para-public policy. The former can include the industrial-relations,
and corporate-governance systems; the latter inter-firm relations, and
vocational training systems. It will not be possible to go into the details
of these different areas here. However, an overview of the main
arguments espoused in the VoC paradigm as well as the ways in which
different (para-)public policies interlink within these broad arguments will
be provided. In short, the VoC approach has two key stages. In the first,
it is argued that different national economic institutions offer distinct
opportunities to companies. As companies are likely to be aware of these
opportunities, they will, on the whole, adjust their production strategies
as well as their use of, for example, different types of human capital
(either general or firm specific) to take advantages of these opportunities.
It is argued that these institutions and, hence, opportunities differ
between countries or at least between groups of countries. Hall and
Soskice (b) distinguish between CMEs, such as Germany and
Sweden, and LMEs, such as the USA and the UK.
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In the former group of countries, labour-market institutions, such as
works councils and industry-wide collective agreements, can promote the
provision of firm-specific skills (Hall and Soskice, b: –); this is
also supported by the fact that many companies in these countries are
financed by bank-based, and not equity, capital. This is said to facilitate
a long-term outlook amongst companies (Casper and Matraves, :
). In the latter group of countries, by contrast, companies do not have
to liaise with worker representatives; they are also freer to hire and fire
workers as they please: ‘ top management normally has unilateral control
over the firm’ (Hall and Soskice, b: ). This will discourage firms
from pursuing ‘ production strategies based on promises of long-term
employment’ (Hall and Soskice, b: , see also ). Such a strategy
is also said to be discouraged by a financial system in which stock markets
play a very prominent role. It is argued that financial markets place
pressure on firms to post good financial results quarter after quarter
(cf. Gospel and Pendleton, ).
In the second key stage in the VoC framework, this reliance on, for
example, different forms of human capital can help to facilitate success in
certain product markets. Workers with firm-specific skills will be a
prerequisite for, though not a guarantee of (Streeck, ), success in
product markets characterized by incremental innovation, which are said
to be ‘ marked by continuous small-scale improvements to existing
product lines and production processes’ (Hall and Soskice, b: ).
Workers with general skills, on the other hand, will be a sine qua non in
markets in which radical innovation – ‘ innovative design and rapid
product development based on research’ (Hall and Soskice, b:
) – is the key to success. For instance, Soskice (: ) has argued
that products from firms in CMEs will ‘ depend on skilled and experi-
enced employees on whom responsibility can be devolved. By contrast,
the United Kingdom and the United States have not been successful in
these areas’. In short, national economic frameworks lay the foundations
for comparative advantage (Hall and Soskice, b: ; see also Casper,
; cf. Whitley, ). This differing success in various product markets
will be reflected in comparative advantage or related data. Hall and
Soskice (b: –, ) and Soskice () have, indeed, used such data
to bolster their arguments (see below).
Are certain public policies necessary for success in some product markets?
In many of their arguments, Hall and Soskice (b) either explicitly or
implicitly argue that, in order to overcome the problems associated with
a strategy of incremental innovation (opportunism by autonomous
workers as well as by managers who have the potential to be exploitative),
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it is necessary to have (para-)public policies similar to those found in
CMEs, paradigmatic examples of which are Germany and Sweden
(Thelen, ; Katzenstein, ; Pontusson and Swenson, ). A
necessary cause, as Ragin (: ) has noted, is one that ‘ must be present
for the outcome in question to occur’. Its presence does not, however,
automatically lead to the outcome. If a factor, in Ragin’s words (:
), ‘ always [produces] the outcome in question’, it is viewed as a suﬃcient
cause. For arguments similar to those of Ragin, see Braumoeller and
Goertz () and Dion ().
Within the VoC approach, it is not argued that CME-type institutions
will always lead to production strategies based on incremental innova-
tion. (For a more in-depth look at the assumptions underpinning the VoC
approach, see Allen, .) For instance, Soskice (: , emphasis
added) has argued that ‘ efficiency [when pursuing a strategy of incre-
mental innovation] requires a more consensus-based approach to decision
making.’ He does not argue that a consensus-based approach to decision
making is suﬃcient to lead to efficiency in this area. In a similar vein,
Soskice (: , emphasis in the original) has also spoken of the ‘ need’,
or necessity, of having ‘ skilled employees with industry-technology skills as
well as company-specific product knowledge skills’, if companies are to
pursue a product strategy of incremental innovation successfully.
The fact that the concept of necessity lies behind many of the
arguments within the VoC approach that relate to public policies has
ramifications for the statistical technique used to assess such argu-
ments. Many conventional statistical techniques, such as multivariate
regressions, conflate the concepts of suﬃciency and necessity (Ragin, :
). The nature of the arguments within the VoC framework, therefore,
militates against their use. This paper, building on previous quantitative
analyses of the VoC approach (see below), will, therefore, examine the
number of sub-sectors in which all of the OECD countries identified
within the VoC literature as either LMEs, CMEs or unclassified have a
comparative advantage in economic areas that are characterized by
incremental or radical innovation. This means that a far greater number
of countries will be included in the analysis than has previously been the
case. It should, of course, be noted that, given the nature of the VoC
arguments, there is unlikely to be a clear dichotomy (or trichotomy)
between CMEs and LMEs (and unclassifieds), and the sub-sectors in
which they have a comparative advantage.
Quantitative empirical tests of the VoC paradigm
The measure used in Hall and Soskice (b) to bolster their arguments
is patent data. Within this data, they classify (although it is not made clear
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how) different industries into either incremental or radical innovators.
Examples, according to Hall and Soskice (b), of sectors charac-
terized by incremental innovation are mechanical engineering, product
handling, transport, consumer durables, and machine tools. Germany,
they argue, is strong in these sectors. Hall and Soskice (b: –)
juxtapose these German strengths next to relative American weakness.
The US is, however, seen as being strong in sectors that are characterized
by radical innovation. It is in these sectors, such as medical engineering,
and biotechnology, that Germany is seen as being weak. It should,
however, be noted that patent data are an inappropriate measure of
comparative advantage, as patents might only ‘ translate’ very poorly into
comparative advantage. For example, the fax machine, though patented
in Europe, proved to be a great commercial success for many Japanese
companies (Schro¨der, ).
Researchers who have propounded the VoC approach have not just
relied on patent data, however. They have also tried to bolster their
arguments with comparative empirical evidence on export success in
different industrial sectors. For instance, adducing data from Michael
Porter (), Soskice (: ) notes that, in , Germany had 
(unnamed) industries in the (undefined) ‘ machine industry’ sectors of the
economy that were ‘ internationally competitive’. Soskice, relying on
Porter’s work (which drew, as this paper does, on data at the five-digit
classification level), defined ‘ internationally competitive’ in an unsatis-
factory way (see below) to mean that, in those  industries, the export
share was larger than Germany’s aggregate export share. In the
‘ machine industry’ sectors of the economy, Soskice (: ) noted that
the UK had just  industries that were internationally competitive. The
contrast with Germany is, therefore, stark.
Soskice’s analysis does not stop there. He goes on to note that the UK,
a good example of an LME (King and Wood, ), has a strong export
record in ‘ service industries’, whilst Germany fares relatively badly.
Soskice (: ) notes that in these industries, Germany had seven
sectors that were internationally competitive, whereas the UK had ,
and the US . Soskice argues that these industries rely on the individual
skills of highly trained and mobile professionals. They include, amongst
other things, management consultancy, advertising and related media
services, and investment banking. These data would, therefore, appear to
support Hall and Soskice’s arguments (b: ) that there are ‘ cross-
national patterns of specialization’. This is especially true given the fact
that Soskice () also includes data for Switzerland, Sweden, and Italy
in his analysis. However, to support their claims, Hall and Soskice (b)
surely have to show that the data for a broader range of countries –
ideally, for all countries that they classify as either LMEs or CMEs (Hall
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and Soskice, b: –) – are consistent with their contentions. This
paper attempts to do that by providing data on all those OECD countries
assigned to one of three groups in the VoC framework.
Moreover, despite providing some examples of economic sectors that
can be said to be characterized by either incremental or radical innova-
tion, Soskice’s () categorization is relatively limited, and, hence, is an
inadequate basis upon which to found a detailed cross-national assess-
ment of trade specialization. A much more rigorous and extensive
classification of economic sectors has been utilized within the VoC
literature by Fioretos (: ). This latter classification was devised by
the OECD to assign different economic sectors to one of five categories.
The two categories that are of interest here are the ‘ specialized supplier’
and ‘ science-based’ ones, as they conform closely to industries character-
ized by incremental and radical innovation respectively. (The other
three categories are ‘ resource intensive’, ‘ labour intensive’ and ‘ scale
intensive’.) The benefits of using this classification are twofold. Firstly, it
enables the research undertaken here to be replicated. Secondly, and
most importantly, it enables comprehensive data to be drawn upon that
are not only available for all OECD countries, but that are also available
at a very low level of aggregation. This is especially relevant given the fact
that the VoC applies to the competitiveness of firms within specific
industries (Hall and Soskice, b).
Data and methodology
The data used in this article are drawn from the OECD’s database on
international trade by commodities statistics (revision ). Data at the
lowest possible level of aggregation are used; this is usually the five-digit
level, but, where this level does not exist, the four-digit level has been
drawn upon. Data for  are used as they are the latest year for which
export data are available for all  OECD member states and territories.
(Hong Kong and Taipei are considered here as separate entities to the
People’s Republic of China.) The reported comparative advantages and
disadvantages are for those countries clearly identified in the VoC
literature as either CMEs, LMEs or unclassified.
Comparative advantages and disadvantages are based on the measure
of revealed symmetric comparative advantage (RSCA), which, in turn,
builds upon Balassa’s () index of revealed comparative advantage.
The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of sector j in country i is
calculated as follows:
RCA =
(country i exports in sector j/total exports from country i)
(OECD exports in sector j/total OECD exports)
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The numerator in the above term represents the ratio between a
country’s exports in a given sector and the country’s total exports; this
ratio is then compared to the ratio for the same sector for the OECD as
a whole (including country i’s exports). If the RCA equals  for a sector,
the country’s exports in that sector as a share of the country’s total
exports is the same as the ‘ average’ for that sector for the OECD as a
whole. When the RCA is greater than , the country under consideration
has a revealed comparative advantage in that sector. When the RCA is
less than , the country has a revealed comparative disadvantage in that
sector. The RCA could take any value between  and infinity, and, thus,
is difficult to use in cross-country comparisons. In order to overcome
this problem, Laursen () has suggested transforming the RCA as
follows:
RSCA = (RCA – )/(RCA + )
This makes the index symmetrical about zero: values above zero indicate
a comparative advantage, figures below zero indicate a comparative
disadvantage. It can range from   to .
The RSCA index is a more appropriate measure to use than that
employed by Soskice (, ), as the RSCA takes the ‘ tradability’ of
different goods into account. Soskice’s measure of ‘ international com-
petitiveness’ does not compare export success across nations, but within
them. It is calculated as follows:
‘ International competitiveness’ =
(country i exports in sector j/total production in sector j in country i)
aggregate export share for country i
If the export ratio for one sector is higher than the aggregate export
share for the entire economy, then, on Soskice’s measure, that sector is
internationally competitive. However, as Soskice does not compare one
country’s export success to that of other countries, he has no way of
knowing whether or not he is merely assessing the ease with which that
product can be exported. It could, for example, be the case that one
particular product has an above-average export record in one country.
For Soskice this would be evidence of product specialization. If this
product has an above-average export record in other countries, all
these countries would, on Soskice’s measure, be specialized in the
trade of that commodity. Yet the concept of ‘ comparative advantage’
surely requires a measure that compares export success between
countries and not just within them. The RSCA outlined above does
just that.
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Success in sectors characterized by incremental innovation
The next two sections set out the comparative advantages of the various
OECD countries in sectors characterized by incremental and radical
innovation. They are followed by an in-depth discussion of the data.
Table  shows the number of sub-sectors, within the three broader
economic sectors characterized by incremental innovation, in which the
countries have a comparative advantage. The Table also ranks the
countries. All of the rankings are based solely on the absolute number of
sub-sectors in which the countries have a comparative advantage. They
do not take into consideration the values of the actual exports or the
magnitude of the RSCA scores. So, for instance, in the ‘ non-electrical
machinery’ sector, Germany has a comparative advantage in the most
sub-sectors (). It is, therefore, ranked first. In situations in which
two or more countries have the same number of sub-sectors with a
comparative advantage, they are ranked in equal place.
In the sectors shown in Table , CMEs should tend to do well, whereas
LMEs should perform less well, if the VoC framework is correct. The
data within the ‘ non-electrical machinery’ sectors (columns i and ii of
Table ) offer support to the VoC framework. Of those countries ranked
in the top five in this sector (column i), four are, as expected by the
theory, CMEs (Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Austria); the fifth (Italy)
is not classified in the framework. The USA, ranked sixth, is the best
placed LME, and it has substantially fewer sub-sectors ( out of a
possible ) in which it has a comparative advantage within the
‘ non-electrical machinery’ sector than Germany (). Moreover,
Australia and Ireland are ranked in the bottom two places in this sector.
The data from the ‘ electrical machinery’ category (columns iii and iv
of Table ) is less straightforward to interpret, as the USA performs
significantly better than anticipated within the VoC paradigm. Indeed,
although Japan has the greatest number of sub-sectors with a compara-
tive advantage, the USA outperforms major CMEs, such as Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden, in an area in which, if the VoC approach is
correct, all of the CMEs should be able to gain a comparative advantage
over the USA because of their institutional settings. That this is not the
case does not, however, vitiate the VoC approach (see below, for a
discussion). It should also be noted that the USA is the only LME to
perform well in the sector; the UK is, in ninth position, the next highest
placed LME.
The evidence from the ‘ communications equipment and semiconduc-
tors’ category (columns v and vi of Table ) poses a challenge to the
theoretical predictions of the VoC approach. Although Japan, a CME,
tops the Table, the next three positions are occupied by LMEs.
Moreover, Germany, one of the major CMEs, performs badly in this
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area. One explanation of this result, which is discussed below, is that the
second stage of the VoC framework, outlined above, overlooks the
importance of radical and innovative innovation within the same sector.
Success in sectors characterized by radical innovation
Table  presents evidence in sectors in which, if the VoC is correct,
LMEs should tend to perform better than CMEs; success in these sectors
is said to rely on the ability to carry out radical innovations. Columns i
and ii of Table  show the rank and number of sectors in which the
selected OECD countries have a comparative advantage in the ‘ aero-
space’ sector. These columns offer strong evidence in support of the VoC
approach. Of the four countries with the greatest number of sub-sectors
with a comparative advantage in the ‘ aerospace’ sector, three are LMEs
and the fourth, France, is unclassified in the VoC literature (Hall and
Soskice, b: –). Moreover, Australia, which is ranked in the
bottom half (indeed, often the bottom quarter) in the sectors covered by
Table , moves into the top half in ‘ aerospace’ sector. Furthermore,
major CMEs, such as Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands, perform
particularly badly in this sector.
Columns iii and iv of Table  show the number of sub-sectors within
the ‘ computers’ sector in which the selected countries have a compara-
tive advantage. Whilst the USA has the highest number of sub-sectors
with a comparative advantage within this sector, the Netherlands (a
CME) outperforms all the other LMEs. Japan, another CME, is ranked
higher than all but two LMEs. However, it is also worth noting that the
UK (ranked third), Ireland and Australia perform significantly better in
this sector, which is characterized by radical innovation, than they do in
sectors in which incremental innovation plays a greater role. Therefore,
the evidence can be seen as supportive of the VoC framework.
Columns v and vi of Table  show the rank and number of sub-sectors
in which the countries have a comparative advantage in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The evidence in these columns is, on the whole, consistent
with the expectations of the VoC framework. Three LMEs (the UK, the
USA and Ireland) outperform all CMEs except Switzerland. Indeed,
these three LMEs perform much better than significant CMEs, such as
Germany, Sweden and Japan. Although the VoC paradigm would not
predict that Switzerland would perform better than CMEs in this sector,
the fact that it has the highest number of sub-sectors in the pharmaceu-
tical sector with a comparative advantage does not necessarily contradict
the VoC approach (see below).
The data in column viii of Table , which shows the number of
sub-sectors within the ‘ scientific instruments’ sector in which the selected
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countries have a comparative advantage, pose a challenge to the
theoretical expectations of the VoC approach. To be sure, in the rankings
(column vii), the USA performs better than all of the other countries in
this sector. However, none of the three countries ranked second to
fourth is an LME. Indeed, they are all CMEs. Moreover, the UK is
the only other CME ranked in the top half, and it has substantially
fewer sub-sectors in which it has a comparative advantage than both
Switzerland and Germany.
Discussion and implications for future research
The presence of the USA in sixth place in the ‘ non-electrical machinery’
sector does not vitiate the VoC framework, as most LMEs perform poorly
in this sector. As noted above, proponents of the VoC approach would
not expect there to be a strict dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs.
Similarly, the very low position of Norway in all of the sectors shown in
Table  does not negate the main contentions of the VoC paradigm.
Indeed, given the complex nature of comparative advantage, it would be
very surprising to find all CMEs at the top of the Table and all LMEs at
the bottom. For instance, Norway is fortunate in that it can export large
amounts of valuable oil; this is likely to influence its comparative
advantage in other areas. In other words, export success will not just
depend upon the national institutional infrastructure, but also on other
factors that may be largely unrelated to public policies, such as the
exchange rate. To use Boyer’s () terms, these may have nothing to do
with a country’s virtu´ (or its virtues) and everything to do with its fortuna
(or luck). Therefore, the evidence in columns i and ii in Table  supports
the VoC framework. Similar arguments may also apply to Australia,
Ireland and New Zealand in the ‘ aerospace’ sector, a sector in which,
despite the fact that other LMEs do well, these three countries perform
badly.
There are two possible explanations for the USA’s success in the
‘ electrical machinery’ sector. Firstly, if success in this sector does rely on
incremental innovation, it could be the case that the VoC approach
downplays the importance of other institutions or resources that firms in
the USA may be able to draw upon to pursue successfully strategies of
incremental innovation (see below also). Secondly, it could also be the
case that the VoC approach overlooks the importance of radical
innovation in promoting success in this sector. However, as the USA is
the only LME to do well in this sector (Australia and Canada are ranked
in the bottom two places, and the UK is ranked ninth behind major
CMEs, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden), this suggests
that the former explanation may be the more likely.
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The latter explanation may, however, be more appropriate in other
sectors. Whilst, in a large number of sectors it may be true that either
radical or incremental innovators will be the most successful, it may not
hold for others. It may, for instance, be the case that categorizing success
in different economic sectors as being reliant on either incremental or
radical innovation overlooks the possibility that both radical and incre-
mental innovators can succeed within the same market. This would
suggest that the second key stage of the VoC approach outlined above
downplays the importance of different innovation strategies within the
same market. This explanation does not, necessarily, call into question
the first stage. For example, firms operating in the same product market
in LMEs and CMEs may pursue different innovation strategies (radical
and incremental innovation, respectively) that are consistent with the
expectations of the VoC approach; however, contrary to the VoC model,
firms in both countries may succeed internationally as both types of
innovators can succeed within that market. Such a process may be at
work in the ‘ computers’, and ‘ scientific instruments’ sectors as firms from
both LMEs and CMEs can be successful in both of these sectors. In order
to assess the importance of such trade within different economic
sub-sectors, a more finely grained research design than has been possible
here will be needed.
The evidence from the ‘ computers’ sector also raises issues of
differences both within national economies and between national
economies that are otherwise very similar. Given the broad focus of
the VoC paradigm, such differences cannot be given prominence.
However, there is some research to suggest that both (sub-)sectoral
differences within one country and variation in the same (sub-)sector
between countries that are otherwise similar are important. On the
former, for instance, Schmidt and Williams () have found that
shareholder value has increased in importance in some sectors of the
Germany economy (see also Thelen and Kume, ); on the latter,
there is some evidence to suggest that the production strategies of
Finnish and German companies within the same sub-sector are differ-
ent (Geppert et al., ), despite the fact that their national public
policies are similar. (See, also, many of the contributions in Yamamura
and Streeck, , even if the authors of those papers, whilst paying
attention to variation, do not relate it to comparative advantage).
Thus, it could be the case that there is substantial public-policy
variation between LMEs in this sector or that the effects of public
policies within individual economies in this area differ greatly from the
norm for that country. By raising such anomalies, this paper has
highlighted those areas that may, once again, benefit most from more
finely grained research than has been possible here.
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The evidence presented on the pharmaceutical industry supports, on
the whole, the VoC paradigm, and it also complements sub-sector
analysis that is based, predominantly, on qualitative data. For instance,
the evidence provided here supports the results of Casper and Matraves
() who concluded that British firms were more likely than German
ones to succeed in pharmaceutical markets because their (para-)public
policy setting favoured radical innovation. However, within this sector,
Switzerland, a CME outperforms all other countries in a sector in which
an LME would be expected to have the greatest number of sub-sectors
with a comparative advantage. As Switzerland is the only CME to do
well in this area, it represents an anomaly for the VoC paradigm.
This suggests either that firms in Switzerland are able to draw on other
resources that do not play a prominent role in the VoC framework or
that they are able to develop what Crouch and Farrell (: ) have
termed ‘ previously unknown capacities’ (see also, Streeck, ). A closer
examination of the pharmaceutical industry in Switzerland is warranted
to identify other resources upon which firms can draw in order to succeed
in areas that are not, at first glance, favoured by their public-policy
setting. In a related field, Casper and Whitley () have suggested that
firms in Sweden have been able to draw on resources beyond those
identified by the VoC approach to succeed in an area (middleware
software) that is not promoted by national public policies. Other
anomalies, such as Dutch success in ‘ computers’ and US success in
‘ electrical machinery’, might also be of interest to researchers. The, from
the VoC perspective, unexpected success of firms in CMEs in ‘ scientific
instruments’ and ‘ communications equipment and semiconductors’
could also be explained by their ability to draw on resources that are not
given prominence within the VoC framework.
An alternative interpretation of Swiss success in the pharmaceutical
industry might be that companies in Switzerland have been able to use
those institutions identified in the VoC paradigm in ways that are not
foreseen by that framework. If firms in Switzerland have been able to do
this, it represents an important opportunity from which companies in
other CMEs can learn. This is important as it represents a chance for
companies to improve their performance without having to rely on
public-policy reforms, which, because they are highly sensitive politically,
may take a long time to occur.
Among the more general features of the two tables it is worth noting
that in line with VoC expectations, Japan is placed higher in all sectors
characterized by incremental innovation than it is in those marked by
radical innovation. This is also true with the exception of ‘ computers’,
for Sweden. Similarly, Ireland, with the exception of ‘ communications
equipment and semiconductors’ and ‘ scientific instruments’, performs
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better in sectors characterized by radical innovation than in those in
which incremental innovation plays a greater role. Indeed, with the
exception of ‘ communications equipment and semiconductors’, the UK
also performs better in areas marked by radical innovation than in those
sectors in which incremental innovation is more important. Even the
USA, which also performs well in sectors characterized by incremental
innovation, does better in those sectors in which radical innovation plays
a greater role (with the exception of the ‘ pharmaceutical’ sector).
Conclusion
By adopting a quantitative and, in comparison to many other VoC
studies in this area, broader approach, this article has shed new light on
the possible link between public policies and comparative advantage.
Overall, the findings are in line with the expectations of the VoC
framework. In many important economic sectors, national public policies
can influence patterns of competitive advantage.
What does this imply for public policy? The results here suggest that
calls to deregulate economies underestimate the advantages that non-
market institutions can confer on companies in economic sectors that are
characterized by incremental innovation. In other words, critics of more
highly regulated public policies (Schiltz, ; Siebert, ) have tended
to adopt a one-sided view of these policies, as they have overlooked
the potential benefits that these policies can confer on private-sector
organizations. Such benefits can include the acquisition by workers of
firm-specific skills; these skills are, in turn, an important necessity in
certain product markets.
Critics of highly regulated public policies may counter that in sectors
such as aerospace and pharmaceutical products such policies do not
appear to offer advantages to firms, and that public policies should,
therefore, be reformed along neo-liberal lines. This may, however,
represent a simplistic reading of the data. As noted above, there are
firms in CMEs that perform well in sectors characterized by radical
innovation. This suggests that such firms may have been able to develop
‘ previously unknown’ capabilities that enable them to overcome the
co-ordination problems associated with such innovation strategies. If they
have been able to do this, they have done so despite the fact that their
public-policy setting does not promote innovation strategies based on
radical innovation. Alternatively, firms in CMEs that perform well in
sectors characterized by radical innovation may have been able to draw
upon other resources beyond those identified in the VoC framework.
Regardless of which interpretation is the more accurate, such
anomalies represent important examples from which firms in other
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CMEs can learn. Therefore, it may be more appropriate – and politically
feasible – for governments in CMEs to promote such learning rather
than to undertake extensive public-policy reforms that may well
jeopardize firms’ strengths in other areas. In other words, the strength of
many CMEs in sectors that are based on incremental innovation suggests
that governments cannot undertake wholesale public-policy reforms as
such reforms are likely to undermine those strengths. It would appear to
be better for governments in CMEs to learn from the practices of those
CMEs that are able to achieve success not only in sectors characterized
by incremental innovation, but also in those sectors that are marked by
radical innovation. (The same arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to those
firms in LMEs that perform well in markets characterized by incremental
innovation.)
When considering any potential public-policy reforms, governments
will also have to pay attention to the significance of the different forms of
innovation to the country’s economic success in terms of, for example,
national income, jobs, economic growth, and welfare. In other words, is
it better (however the term is defined) to be more successful in incremen-
tal or radical innovation? Relatedly, research into the development of the
importance of sectors characterized by incremental and radical innova-
tion over time should also be conducted to determine whether radical
innovation is losing or gaining in importance, and thus whether in the
future it will be better to have public policies that promote incremental or
radical innovation. At present, this aspect of the debate is missing.
NOTES
. The authors would like to thank Orfeo Fioretos for his help in clarifying the OECD’s classification
system used in this paper. We are also indebted to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
. A list of the sub-sectors included within each category is available from the corresponding author on
request.
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